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2009年3月 5日 (木)

アメリカよ・新ニッポン論:第2部・改革の構造

(Mainichi Japan) March 5, 2009

U.S. can learn from Japan's structural reform experience during 'lost decade' (Pt. 2)

アメリカよ・新ニッポン論:第2部・改革の構造/1(その2)

   <1面からつづく>


 ◆改革、実態は追随

 ◇主導者も手本もなく


In February this year, Mario Mizukami, 75, former LTCB vice president, wrote a letter to Tsuneo Suzuki, 66, the last president of the LTCB, and the author of a book titled "The Disappearance of a Mega Bank."

 1998年に破綻(はたん)した日本長期信用銀行(長銀、現・新生銀行)の水上萬里夫元副頭取(75)は2月、最後の頭取だった鈴木恒男氏(66)に手紙を送った。鈴木氏が昨年12月に出版した「巨大銀行の消滅」(東洋経済新報社)を読み、矢も盾もたまらず筆を執った。

Suzuki's book ends with the phrase, "I want to believe that the confusion that the LTCB's failure and disappearance of all long-term credit banks in Japan caused to economic society and the public's burden were aimed at establishing the new principles for financial institutions and the reconstruction of the financial system."

 著書は次の言葉で終わっている。

 「金融機関の新しい理念の確立と金融システムの再構築。長銀の破綻、長信銀の消滅に伴う経済社会の混乱と巨額の国民負担は、そのためのものだったと、私は思いたい」

Former LTCB executives won all criminal and civil trials over their responsibility for the failure of the bank, which lasted for about 10 years. The top court ruled that they could not be found guilty of failing to abide by hastily created rules.

 鈴木氏や前任の大野木克信元頭取ら旧経営陣が、不良債権隠しの粉飾決算容疑に問われた10年越しの刑事・民事事件は昨年7月、いずれも無罪・棄却に終わった。司法は、急ごしらえの新ルールに従わなかった「罪」は問えないと判断した。

After confirming that the government made a mistake in the way it revised relevant rules, Suzuki expressed his view in his book.

 政府のルール変更のやり方に過ちがあったことを確認した鈴木氏は、同書で初めて見解を公にした。

Nevertheless, former executives are responsible for their mismanagement. It is these former executives that accumulated nonperforming loans that triggered the failure of the LTCB because they were unable to manage the risks involving loans for real estate transactions. This also rings true for executives at U.S. banks who used a method of computational finance but failed to manage the risk involved. Mizukami expressed these thoughts in his letter to Suzuki.

 それでも、経営失敗の「罪」は消えない。破綻の原因となった不良債権は、不動産融資のリスクを管理できない経営陣が積み上げた。金融工学を駆使したあげくリスク管理に失敗した現在の米銀行経営陣と同じだ。水上氏は私信で問いただした趣旨を説明した。

Mizukami added: "Suzuki and other executives firmly believed that banks will not go down as long as they follow the instructions of the Finance Ministry, and that the ministry will protect them. However, the ministry itself became unable to resist the trends of globalization. If that is the case, it is executives that determine the direction of their own banks. Suzuki's book does not display a sense of responsibility for failing to save their bank. Is everything attributable to the United States, the trends of the times and the Japanese government?"

 「鈴木氏たちは、旧大蔵(現財務)省の言うことを聞いてさえいれば、銀行のかじ取りは間違うことはない、国が何とかすると思い込んでいたが、大蔵省自体が金融グローバル化の流れに耐えられなくなっていた。国がそうなら自分で進路を決めるのが経営者だ。鈴木氏の本からは、経営に失敗した者の責任感が感じられない。何もかもアメリカや時代や政府のせいなのか」

In an interview with the Mainichi Suzuki said, "My view is nothing more or less than what I wrote in my book."

 鈴木氏は取材に対し「私の認識は本に書いたこと以上でも以下でもない」と答えた。

Mizukami and Suzuki were in completely different positions prior to the failure of the LTCB.

 破綻前の長銀で2人は対照的な立場にいた。

Mizukami, who specialized in international business, was playing a key role in the structural reform of the bank. He pursued a U.S.-style business model to keep pace with U.S.-led globalization. "The liberalization of financial services is historical inevitability. We have no choice but to transform ourselves into an investment bank," he had told colleagues.

国際派の水上氏は長銀「構造改革」路線の中心にいた。「金融の自由化は歴史的必然。生き残るには投資銀行になるしかない」と、米主導のグローバル化の流れに自ら打って出る米国型の経営モデルを目指した。

Radical reform led by Mizukami raised concern among other executives. Domestic-minded executives rallied and they returned to the LTCB's traditional business centering on loans for real estate transactions when it adopted its 1989 business plan. In other words, it sought to survive in line with the Finance Ministry's policy. Mizukami consequently quit the bank.

 急激な「改革」に不安や不満が高まった。国内派は巻き返す。89年の経営計画で不動産融資の従来業務中心に逆戻りし、旧大蔵省の方針に沿う形での延命を目指した。水上氏は銀行を去った。

Those who were focusing on the domestic market came to a deadlock following the bursting of the speculation-driven, asset-inflating bubble economy in the early 1990s. In 1993, Yoichi Takahashi, who was an official with the Finance Ministry's Banking Inspection Department, urged banks to assess their loans extended to nonblank financial institutions using the so-called discounted cash flow method initially introduced by the United States.

"Sumitomo Trust and Banking followed it while the LTCB did not," recalls Takahashi, who is now a professor at Toyo University.

 国内派は、バブル崩壊で行き詰まる。93年に大蔵省金融検査部にいた高橋洋一東洋大教授は、不良債権のリスク管理のため、当時最先端の米国式「収益還元法」を使ったノンバンク向け融資の査定を各行に促したが、「住友信託銀行は受け入れ、長銀は採用しなかった」と証言する。

Shortly before the LTCB went under, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, then Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and then Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka summoned the acting president of the Sumitomo Trust and Banking to the prime minister's official residence late at night and asked that it absorb the LTCB.

 破綻の直前、当時の小渕恵三首相、宮沢喜一蔵相、野中広務官房長官が、夜の首相公邸に住友信託銀の社長を呼び、長銀の救済合併を頼み込んだエピソードは象徴的だ。

A month later, then U.S. President Bill Clinton agreed in talks with Obuchi that the Japanese government would provide banks with an infusion of public funds to prevent them from going under. This is despite the fact that then U.S. Secretary of Treasury Lawrence Henry Summers had openly said bad banks should go under.

 米国はサマーズ財務副長官が「駄目な銀行はつぶすべきだ」と公言していたが、首相公邸の晩から1カ月後、クリントン大統領は小渕首相との会談で、破綻前の銀行への公的資金投入を容認した。

"The U.S. government changed its policy because an economic crisis occurred in Russia and adversely affected Wall Street," recalls Eisuke Sakakibara, who was deputy vice minister for financial affairs at the Finance Ministry at the time.

 榊原英資財務官(当時)は「ロシア経済危機が起き、ウォール街に火の粉が飛んだので、米国は方針転換した」と解説する。

However, Diet deliberations on relevant bills were deadlocked, and frustrated Nonaka agreed to accept a bill presented by opposition parties on measures to rehabilitate the financial sector, including placing the LTCB temporarily under state control.

 結局、国会の停滞にしびれを切らした野中氏が、長銀を一時国有化する野党の金融再生法案を丸のみし、終止符を打った。

 ◇なお残る経営責任

After all, the LTCB went under because it was left behind following dramatic changes in the government's policy to keep pace with global trends. Those who failed to change themselves were accused of not abiding by the new rules. Even though they were acquitted a decade later, the former executives have been held responsible for failing to change themselves, which led to the collapse of the bank.

 米主導の世界の潮流に合わせて国策が急転換し、変化に取り残された長銀は破綻。変われなかった旧経営陣は、新ルールに従わなかった「罪」に問われ、10年後に免罪されたものの、自らを変えられず経営に失敗した責任は永遠に残った。

The process from the collapse of the LTCB leading up to the former executives' acquittal illustrates how Japan has carried out structural reform at the mercy of the United States.

 長銀の破綻から無罪までのてんまつは、米国の都合に振り回された日本の「改革の構造」を浮き彫りにする。

Japan's experiences of structural reform during the so-called "lost decade" not only offer the U.S. a lesson but also raise questions as to how Japan should survive in an age when the United States is drifting.

 「失われた10年」と呼ばれた構造改革の経験は、今の米国の教訓になるどころか、米国追随でしか変われずにきた日本が、米国漂流の時代をどう生きていくのかを問い掛けている。

毎日新聞 200932日 東京朝刊

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