社説:吉田調書公開 次は「幸運」に頼れない

September 12, 2014(Mainichi Japan)
Editorial: Nuclear plants cannot rely on luck
社説:吉田調書公開　次は「幸運」に頼れない

A document detailing testimony by the late former head of the tsunami-hit Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant conveys the terror of the serious accident at the atomic power station that occurred 3 1/2 years ago.
　原発過酷事故の恐ろしさが３年半たった今も生の言葉から伝わってくる。

The record of the government fact-finding panel's hearing of Masao Yoshida, former head of the power plant, over the accident has been released along with those on interviews with 18 others.
東京電力福島第１原発の事故当時の所長、吉田昌郎氏が政府の事故調査・検証委員会のヒアリングに答えた「吉田調書」が、他の１８人分の調書とともに公開された。
   
The document quotes Yoshida as saying, "Nobody came to help us," "Necessary supplies didn't reach us," and "there was a wide perception gap between the plant, the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) headquarters and the prime minister's office."
　「誰も助けにこなかった」「必要な物資が届かない」「現場と東電本店や官邸の認識の差が大きい」。

Both power companies including TEPCO and the government should pay close attention to Yoshida's testimony and clarify whether each problem he pointed out has been improved.
電力会社も政府も、吉田氏の訴えに再度耳を傾け、それが改善されているか、ひとつずつチェックすべきだ。

When the nuclear disaster broke out, the biggest challenge Yoshida and other workers encountered was to inject water into the plant's reactors, and they were asking for outside help. However, no one extended substantive or effective assistance to the plant. A lot of equipment that plant workers needed, such as power-supply vehicles, batteries, fire engines and diesel fuel, reached a nearby supply depot, but there was nobody who was able to transport the supplies to the power station. As a result, workers at the plant were forced to come to the depot to pick up the supplies despite a serious shortage of personnel at the power station. Such a frustrating situation is apparently attributable to high radiation levels inside the plant.
　事故当時、吉田氏らの最大の課題は原子炉に水を入れることであり、外からの支援も求めていた。しかし、実質的で効果的な助けはなかなかこなかった。電源車、バッテリー、消防車、軽油など現場が必要とする資材も途中の基地まではくるが、運ぶ人がいない。結果的に人手が足りない現場から取りに行かざるを得なかった。こうしたもどかしい状況が生じた理由は、現場の放射線量が高かったためと考えられる。

Power companies are primarily responsible for dealing with any accident at power plants they operate. Regardless, it is imperative to address in advance how to support workers at a nuclear power plant where radiation levels have surged in case of a serious nuclear accident and how the national and local governments, the Self-Defense Forces and firefighters should cooperate in responding to the accident.
　事故対策は一義的には電力会社の責任だとしても、過酷事故が起きた場合、放射線量の高い現場をどう支援するのか。政府や自治体、自衛隊、消防などがどう連携するのか。きちんと解決しておかなくてはならない重要課題だ。

During the hearing, Yoshida repeatedly pointed out a perception gap between plant workers, the TEPCO headquarters and the prime minister's office. The headquarters and the prime minister's office did not understand the situation of the plant at the time of the accident. As such, the headquarters ordered plant workers to stop injecting sea water in the reactors at the strong urging of the prime minister's office, obstructing worker's efforts to bring the crisis under control instead of extending support to the workers. The central government and utilities should clearly show whether they have implemented remedial measures to prevent a recurrence of such a problem.
　東電本店や官邸との認識の隔たりについても、吉田氏は繰り返し述べている。本店や官邸は現場の状況を理解せず、支援するどころか、官邸の意向をくんだ本店が海水注入の停止を命じるなど妨害さえした。そんなことが起きないための改善策をきちんと講じているのか、政府や電力会社は明確に示してほしい。

The government stiffened regulatory standards for nuclear plants following the accident but emphasis is primarily placed on the hardware aspect. It is necessary to verify how far countermeasures in the software aspect, such as information and personnel, the flow of supplies and the chain of command, have been taken.
　事故後、規制基準は厳しくなったが、主としてハード面に重きが置かれてきた。情報や人、物資の流れ、指揮命令系統といったソフト面の対策がどこまできちんとなされたか、さらなる検証が必要だ。

Yoshida, who faced a difficult response to the crisis in which the plant's No. 1 to 4 reactors fell into critical condition, pointed out problems involving the concentration of nuclear plants in small areas. However, Japan still faces risks arising from multiple nuclear plants in many areas, and it is necessary to seriously consider how to rectify the situation.
　１〜４号機が次々に危機的状況に陥る中で困難な対応を迫られた吉田氏は、原発の集中立地の問題も指摘している。しかし、現実には日本の原発は複数立地のリスクを抱えたままであり、もっと真剣に改善策を考えなくてはならない。

Yoshida's testimony suggests that the Fukushima No. 1 plant barely evaded a further catastrophe thanks to good luck.
　調書からは、これほどの惨事もある意味で「幸運」に支えられており、さらなる大惨事を紙一重で免れたことも感じとれる。

Recalling the critical situation in which workers had been unable to inject water into the No. 2 reactor over an extended period, Yoshida was quoted as saying, "We were afraid that all radioactive substances would leak and spread. We visualized all of eastern Japan being devastated."
水が入れられない状況が続いた２号機について吉田氏は、「放射性物質が全部出て、まき散らしてしまう。我々のイメージは東日本壊滅」とさえ述べている。

Keeping in mind that the worst-case scenario cannot be prevented by good luck, the government and power suppliers that are aiming to reactivate idled nuclear plants should learn lessons from the Yoshida testimony and all documents released by the government's fact-finding panel.
　原発再稼働を目指す政府や電力会社は、「次の幸運はない」と肝に銘じてほしい。その上で、吉田調書をはじめとする事故調の資料からあらゆる教訓を学びとるべきだ。

毎日新聞　2014年09月12日　02時30分